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DEFINING “PRODUCTION IN PAYING
QUANTITIES”: A SURVEY OF HABENDUM CLAUSE
CASES THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES
JESSICA E. MCDONALD AND ZACHARY M. WALLEN

ABSTRACT
As advances in drilling technology unlock previously inaccessible
shale plays, developers seeking their share of the action may purchase
existing oil and gas leases whose primary terms expired long ago. While
operators pay a premium for the deep rights associated with existing leases,
such asset swaps also have the effect of removing from the equation the
large up-front landowner bonuses and rentals commonly associated with
new Marcellus and Utica leases.1 This has created considerable tension
when landowners who discover that their property is, in fact, covered by an
existing lease question whether an old lease is truly “held by production”
(“HBP”).2 This paper provides a survey of the relevant case law on
habendum clause interpretation throughout the United States in order to
further clarify jurisdictional variations and identify the similarities that exist
regionally and nationally. It provides a look at how much production courts
require to uphold an HBP lease and explains the tests the courts use to
determine whether the required level of production occurred. Throughout
the case law on this issue runs a common theme: courts must carefully
balance lessors’ desire to benefit financially from the development of their
property with operators’ interest in protecting their investments. Given the
variations in the law across the United States, developers must not only
anticipate challenges to the HBP leases they buy, but they must also prepare
themselves for different results depending on a particular court’s location,
history, and jurisprudential precedents.

 Jessica E. McDonald is of counsel and Zachary M. Wallen is an associate at Steptoe &
Johnson PLLC in the firm’s Bridgeport, West Virginia office. Both authors would like to give a
special thanks to Dominique N. Ranieri for her assistance with this article.
1. See, e.g., Michael Rubinkam, Lowball gas drill leases haunt Pa., ASSOCIATED PRESS
(July
23,
2011),
http://news.yahoo.com/ap-enterprise-lowball-gas-drill-leases-haunt-pa190123364 html (discussing the wide variation in landowner royalty payments and describing
instances of landowner dissatisfaction with older, less lucrative, oil and gas leases in the Marcellus
Shale region). See also T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261 (Pa. 2012).
2. See Rubinkam, supra note 1. See also Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264.
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INTRODUCTION

As advances in drilling technology unlock previously inaccessible
shale plays through the United States, many oil and gas developers find
themselves shifting their operations to areas of the country where they have
never before operated. Because much of the land overlying these deep
shale plays remains subject to existing oil and gas leases,3 operators seeking
entry into new frontiers often purchase rights to old leases whose primary
terms expired decades ago.4 While the oil and gas owners will continue to
receive royalties from these HBP leases, those royalties are often much
lower than those of new leases. These oil and gas owners also do not
receive the large up-front bonuses and rentals commonly associated with
new leases.5 Meanwhile, operators pay a premium for the deep rights
associated with existing leases; as such, “held by production” leases are
highly desirable commodities amongst industry players. This tension
makes the question of whether an old lease is truly “held by production”
increasingly contentious.6
Because of regional variations in judicial interpretation and precedent,
developers may not be able to rely on the same arguments they used in the
past in other states when faced with disputes over the validity of an older
lease. A new region may open an entirely new set of legal questions, even
though actual operational processes remain largely the same. Developers
who purchase existing leases must therefore anticipate not only challenges
to the HBP leases they buy, but also the possibility of different outcomes
depending on where the presiding court sits.
To truly understand what it means for a lease to be held by production,
one must examine the construction of a typical oil and gas lease. 7 The
habendum clause in a standard lease contains not only a fixed (or primary)
term, but also a secondary term.8 The secondary term often allows the lease
3. See generally Caleb A. Fielder, Marginal Wells and the Doctrine of Production in Paying
Quantities, 57 LANDMAN MAG. 2 (2011).
4. For a more in-depth discussion of the issues concerning oil and gas leases that are
purportedly held by production, see generally Timothy M. McKeen & Kristen L. Andrews, The
Effect of Missing Production on Ohio’s Held by Production Oil and Gas Leases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
FURTHERMORE 13 (2012).
5. See Rubinkam, supra note 1. See also Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264.
6. See Rubinkam, supra note 1. See also Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264.
7. For a detailed discussion of the history and the evolution of the terms of the standard oil
and gas lease, see PATRICK H. MARTIN AND BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW, § 601 (2012).
8. 2 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE OF LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 26.1 (Rev. Ed. 2011);
Fielder, supra note 3, at 1.
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to continue in perpetuity as long as the developer produces oil or gas from
the land.9 Particulars vary, but habendum clauses in most older leases
allow the lease to continue beyond its primary term for “so long thereafter
as oil or gas is ‘produced,’ or ‘produced in paying quantities,’ or ‘found,’ or
‘found in paying quantities,’ or ‘discovered,’ or ‘discovered in paying
quantities,’ or ‘can be produced,’ or ‘can be produced in paying
quantities.’”10 While a layperson might interpret these phrases literally, the
terms of the habendum clause “have come to be words of art in many
jurisdictions, and such words are not necessarily given their literal
meaning.”11 For example, in most jurisdictions across the country, courts
require production in “paying quantities” even where that exact language is
not used in the habendum clause.12
This paper will provide a survey of the law on habendum clause
interpretation across the United States. We will examine the level of
production that courts require to uphold a lease in its secondary term and
the tests they employ to determine whether production from a particular
leasehold meets their chosen standard. The law on this issue is well
developed in midcontinent states such as Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana,
which have a long and fruitful history of oil and gas development. This is
also true in the eastern states that comprise the Marcellus and Utica Shale
plays, where oil and gas has been produced since 1859, although much of
the relevant case law in those jurisdictions is quite dated, leaving a level of
uncertainty in how modern courts will interpret such decisions.
On the other hand, many states throughout the country have only a few
cases that discuss habendum clauses at all, and those cases may only
address one narrow issue. For those states, we have simply summarized the
case law that exists, but we have not attempted to draw broad-scale
conclusions as to the state’s position on habendum clauses generally.13 In
order to make sense of a vast amount of law, we have grouped the case law
into geographic regions. This approach offers a look at the range of
positions operators may face when moving into a particular operational
area.

9. See KUNTZ, supra note 8, at §§ 26.1, 26.7. See also Richard C. Maxwell, Oil and Gas
Lessee’s Rights on Failure to Obtain Production During the Primary Term or to Maintain
Production Thereafter, 3 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 6 (1957).
10. KUNTZ, supra note 8, at § 26.5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. We did not find any relevant case law in the following states: Alaska, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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II. ANALYSIS
Whether a lease is deemed “held by production” often boils down to
whether it produces in paying quantities. Many courts imply a “paying
quantities” requirement even when the lease does not expressly require it.
Though most courts now agree that “production” means “production in
paying quantities,” the case law on habendum clauses spans a spectrum of
decisions that run the gamut from those that allowed a lease to continue
where the lessee merely discovered oil and gas during the primary term to
those that require that a well be capable of producing in paying quantities to
those that mandate that the lessee actually produce, market, and sell the oil
and gas. In all these cases, courts attempt to strike a balance between
protecting landowners’ interests in benefiting financially from the
development of their property and allowing developers enough leeway in
their operational decisions so that they will continue to invest in the
exploration and development of oil and gas.
On the question of just how much production or development must
occur to extend a lease into its secondary term or hold it by production,
courts in the Midcontinent generally fall into one of two positions. One
side favors a narrow interpretation of secondary term language that requires
actual, physical production and marketing of oil and gas.14 Texas courts
typically embrace this “actual production” approach.15 Supporters argue
that the “actual production” interpretation discourages operators from using
marginally producing wells to hold large tracts of land for speculative
purposes and creates incentives to properly develop leased resources.16 The
“capability rule” adopted by Oklahoma courts, on the other hand, focuses
on the leasehold’s capability of production and does not require the lessee
to actually sell oil and gas during the primary term in order to hold the
lease.17 Proponents of this approach argue that giving the operator broad
discretion to determine whether or not to continue operations on a particular
leasehold “balances the equities between lessee and lessor” and avoids
forfeitures by allowing companies that undertake expensive exploration the
time and opportunity to recoup their costs.18

14. Ashleigh L. Boggs, Note, Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson: Interpretation of Oil
and Gas Lease Habendum Clauses in Texas and Why Oklahoma Should Maintain Its Divergent
Approach to Keep Leases Alive, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 341, 342 (2008).
15. Id. But see id. at 358 (discussing the nuances of the Texas Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the “capability rule”).
16. Id. at 357. See also Fielder, supra note 3, at 2.
17. Boggs, supra note 14, at 348 (discussing the interpretation of “production” by Oklahoma
courts); Fielder, supra note 3, at 3.
18. Boggs, supra note 14, at 342. See also Fielder, supra note 3, at 3.
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Most courts concur that the lessee must produce some oil and gas from
the land in order for a lease to continue beyond its primary term, but the
meaning of the term “produced” varies between states.19 A few outlying
states, such as West Virginia, Illinois and Kentucky, have taken a very
operator-friendly approach in the past and allowed a lease to continue into
its secondary term based upon the “mere discovery” of oil and gas during
the primary term; however, more recent cases in those states show a shift
toward requiring at least enough production to pay the lessor a royalty.20
Courts now nearly universally agree that a well produces in “paying
quantities” when it “pays a profit, even a small one, over the operating
expenses.”21 But the tests used to determine whether profit exists, and the
application of the results therefrom, vary across the country.22
A. THE MIDCONTINENT
Midcontinent courts have addressed the issues presented by the
habendum clause many times over, thus creating a body of well-developed,
nuanced case law.
1.

Texas

While the Texas Supreme Court was not the first to address the
question of whether “produced” means “produced in paying quantities,”
other courts frequently cite its analysis of the issue in Garcia v. King as the
basis of their interpretive reasoning. The lease at issue in Garcia was “for a
term of 10 years from this day (called primary term) and as long thereafter
as oil, gas and other minerals is produced from said land hereunder.”23 At
the end of the primary term, the lease was producing about twenty-four
barrels of oil per month, which, while “susceptible of division . . . was
insufficient to yield a profit over and above operating and marketing
expenses” and “was barely adequate to pay for his labor in operating the
19. KUNTZ, supra note 8, at § 26.5. Courts within the Appalachian region have held
“production” to mean the capability of production, rather than actual physical production in
paying quantities. See discussion infra Part II(B).
20. KUNTZ, supra note 8, at § 26.5.
21. Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 123 (Pa. 1899); Maxwell, supra note 9, at 10. See
also Parks v. Sinai Oil Co., 201 P. 517, 518 (Okla. 1921); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 510
(Tex. 1942); KUNTZ, supra note 9, at § 26.7(d).
22. KUNTZ, supra note 8, at § 26.7. This is not as applicable in the Appalachian region,
where courts have strictly relied on the good-faith determination of the lessee as the test for
whether a given lease has produced in paying quantities, as opposed to the various jurisdictions of
the Midcontinent, where some states rely on the same good-faith test, while others also rely on an
arithmetic component to determine whether production in paying quantities has occurred. See
discussion infra Part II(B).
23. Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 510 (explanatory parenthetical in original text).
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wells.”24 After receiving about eight cents per day as lease royalty during
the primary term, the lessors sued the lessees to cancel the lease.25
At trial, the court found that the lease expired on its terms because
“neither oil nor gas was being ‘produced,’ within the meaning of the
lease.”26 The court of appeals reversed, holding “that it was an error to
construe the word ‘produce’ as to require production in paying
quantities.”27 The Texas Supreme Court then had to determine whether the
term “produced,” when used in a habendum clause, required production “in
paying quantities.”28
The court examined a series of holdings from jurisdictions that had
previously addressed the issue and found only two cases in which courts
indicated that “produced” may not mean “produced in paying quantities.”29
The Supreme Court of Illinois rendered one of these decisions in 1913 in
Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Company, where the court adhered to the strict letter
of the lease and declined to imply a paying quantities requirement.30 The
Texas Supreme Court quickly dismissed this case as having been decided
“before the oil industry had been fully developed.”31
The following dicta, taken from a case decided by the Supreme Court
of Kentucky, also appeared to suggest that a “paying quantities”
requirement should not be implied:
It will be observed that the lessee is not required to produce oil in
paying quantities, but he is required to produce oil or gas one or
the other, from the premises. This, of course, means a production
of oil or gas in such quantities as to be susceptible of division, so
as to pay the landowner a royalty, even though small. A mere
showing of oil manifestly is not sufficient, even though produced.

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. King v. Garcia, 152 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (“To hold that the word
‘produced’ as used in the Habendum clause of the lease here involved is synonymous with the
phrase ‘produced in paying quantities,’ would be substituting a limitation upon the determinable
fee which is different in legal effect from the limitation agreed upon by the parties. It would
amount to an overriding by implication of the intention of the parties expressed in a binding
contract.”).
28. Id.
29. Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 510-11.
30. Id. at 511(citing Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 102 N.E. 1043, 1044 (Ill. 1913)). For a
detailed discussion of the Gillespie decision, see our Illinois section, discussion infra Part II(C)(1).
31. Id.
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The production must be tangible and substantial, but it need not be
great.32
Despite this statement, however, the well at issue in that particular case
produced “only a mere scum of oil, and the court held that this was
insufficient to keep the contract in force.”33 Noting that the Supreme Court
of Kentucky’s ultimate holding in the case did not turn on its sentiment that
production in paying quantities was unnecessary, the Texas Supreme Court
also declined to rely on that case.34
Finding that the weight of authority supported the plaintiffs’ position
that production must be in paying quantities, the court also noted the
importance of marketing the product, stating: “[t]he term ‘paying
quantities’ involves not only the amount of production, but also the ability
to market the product at a profit.”35 Returning to the lease at issue, the
court pointed out that all of the producing wells on the property, when taken
together, failed to produce enough to pay a profit over operating costs when
the primary term ended.36 Accordingly, the court held that “the object
sought to be accomplished by the continuation” of the lease “had ceased,
and the lease had terminated.”37
The Texas Supreme Court expanded on the requirement of production
in paying quantities in Clifton v. Koontz by creating an explicit two-step
approach to determine whether a lease produces in paying quantities.38 The
court’s objective two-prong test requires courts to first calculate profits and
losses over a reasonable time period. If the lessee’s activities fail to yield a
profit over operating expenses and a net loss occurs, the court must then
determine whether a reasonable and prudent operator would continue
operating the well under the circumstances.39
The operative fact pattern in Clifton was that the oil and gas owner,
Clifton, sought to cancel the lease on her land by arguing it terminated due
to cessation of production in paying quantities.40 She argued that the lease
failed to produce in paying quantities after sustaining a loss for two
consecutive months.41 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument,
32. Id. (quoting Enfield v. Woods, 248 S.W. 842 (Ky. 1923)). We discuss the quoted
Enfield decision more particularly in the Kentucky section, discussion infra Part II(B)(3).
33. Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 511.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 512.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 513.
38. 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959).
39. Id. (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1942)).
40. Id. at 687.
41. Id. at 688-89.
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explaining that “there can be no arbitrary period for determining the
question of whether or not a lease has terminated.”42
Clifton offered evidence that for the “period of time from June 1955
through September 1956, the income from the lease was $3,250.00 and that
the total expense of operations during the same period was $3,466.16—
thus, a loss of $ 216.16 for the sixteen months’ period.”43 The court
questioned the time period Clifton used to calculate lease profits derived
from the marginal well. Because the lessee began reworking the well on
September 12, 1956, the court pointed out that “the evidence that there was
a small operating loss for the period of time from July 1956 through
September 1956 is not controlling in determining whether or not there had
been a cessation of production in paying quantities through July 12, 1956, a
date 60 days prior to the beginning of reworking operations.”44 The court
instead focused on the profits and losses prior to the time the sixty-day
period set forth in the cessation of production clause took effect, which
occurred before July 12, 1956.45 Using month-by-month figures, the court
determined that during the relevant period, beginning in June 1955 and
continuing through July 12, 1956, the lessee operated at a profit of
$111.25.46
When confronted with a marginal well, the court explained:
[T]he standard by which paying quantities is determined is
whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably
prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not
merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner in
which the well in question was operated.47
Therefore, the court concluded:
In determining paying quantities . . . the trial court necessarily
must take into consideration all matters which would
influence a reasonable and prudent operator. Some of the
factors are: The depletion of the reservoir and the price for
which the lessee is able to sell his produce, the relative
profitableness of other wells in the area, the operating and
marketing costs of the lease, his net profit, the lease
42. Id. at 690. This has later been construed by Texas courts to be “a reasonable period of
time based on the facts of the case; courts have used time periods as brief as six months or as long
as two years.” Fielder, supra note 3, at 3.
43. Clifton, 325 S.W.2d at 689.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 691.
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provisions, a reasonable period of time under the
circumstances, and whether or not the lessee is holding the
lease merely for speculative purposes.48
In short, the court explained:
Whether there is a reasonable basis for the expectation of
profitable returns from the well is the test. If the quantity
be sufficient to warrant the use of the gas in the market,
and the income therefrom is in excess of the actual
marketing cost, and operating costs, the production
satisfies the term “in paying quantities.”49
This standard allows operations to continue in certain cases, “even
though drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid and the
undertaking considered as a whole may ultimately result in a loss.”50 The
court explained that:
The underlying reason for this definition appears to be that when a
lessee is making a profit over the actual cash he must expend to
produce the lease, he is entitled to continue operating in order to
recover the expense of drilling and equipping, although he may
never make a profit on the over-all operation.51
Recognizing such principles, the court rejected Clifton’s contention
that the profit and loss figures should include depreciation of the original
investment cost as an operating expense, explaining that “[d]epreciation is
nothing more than an accounting charge of money spent in purchasing
tangible property, and if the investment itself is not to be considered, as is
held by this Court, then neither is depreciation.”52 Finding that the
evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was production in
paying quantities, as well as marketing facilities and the actual sale of gas at
a profit, the court held that the lease had not terminated.53
The Texas Supreme Court further explained its position on marketing
in its 1960 decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid.54 In that case, the lessee
began drilling just a few days before the end of the five-year primary term
and finally completed the well after the primary term had ended.55 While
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 692.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 691. The court also discussed several other arguments presented by the petitioners
involving breach of the implied covenant to develop and to explore.
54. 337 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1960).
55. Id. at 268.
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the well was clearly capable of production, Gulf Oil capped it (essentially
“turning off” production temporarily) due to a lack of marketing facilities.56
Approximately a month later, the lessee tendered a shut-in royalty payment
that the lessor rejected.57 Four months later, the lessee contracted with a
pipeline company to sell the gas, and the well produced in paying quantities
until the lessor sued to cancel the lease.58
The court defined the main issue before it as “whether the so-called
‘shut-in’ royalty payment, tendered after a well capable of producing gas
only in paying quantities had been capped, was so timely made as to extend
the term of an oil and gas lease after the expiration of the primary term.”59
Citing Garcia, the court held:
[T]he word “production” as used in the habendum clause of this
lease is equivalent to the phrase “production in paying quantities.”
The term “paying quantities” embraces not only the amount of
production, but also the ability to market the product at a profit.
Garcia et al v. King et al, 139 Texas 578, 164 S.W. 2d 509, 512.
As said in that case, “the object of the contract was to secure the
development of the property for the mutual benefit of the parties.
It was contemplated that this would be done during the primary
term of the contract.” To this sentence we might add the phrase,
“or during the extension of the lease term.” Thus, no matter how
great the potential production may be or how many million cubic
feet of gas may have been flared, there would be no production or
production in paying quantities unless there was an available
market . . . the fact that there is no available market is not an
excuse for failure to produce, and the lease terminates unless some
other provision will keep it in force.60
Even after capping its well, Gulf Oil actively negotiated with the
pipeline company to find a market for its product, but it did not conduct
“any manual operations” until after it entered into the pipeline contract five
months after completing the well.61 While the trial court found that Gulf
Oil acted diligently in seeking a market, the Texas Supreme Court
disagreed:

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 269-70 (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W. 2d 509, 512 (1942)).
Id. at 272.
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To sum up, there was no production from the well during the term
of the lease as extended by drilling operations; the ‘shut-in’ royalty
was not paid so as to bring about constructive or contractual
production, and no provisions of the lease can be construed to
furnish a further extension of the primary term or to make the
tender of royalty in this case timely.62
Therefore, the court concluded that the lease terminated. 63
In Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the issue of temporary cessations of production within the
framework of the actual production doctrine.64 The lease in this case stated
that the lease “shall remain in force for a term of one (1) year and as long
thereafter as gas is or can be produced,” and it also provided that “if
production ceases for any reason, the lease ‘shall not terminate provided
lessee resumes operations for drilling a well within sixty (60) days from
such cessation.’”65 Production first began in 1936, but it “totally ceased for
sixty-one days in 1981 and ninety-one days in 1985 while the gas purchaser
conducted pipeline repairs. In 1997, Thompson sued for declaration that
the lease terminated when production ceased in 1981 and for conversion of
damages.”66 The trial court ruled in favor of the landowner, Thompson,
finding that the lease terminated due to cessation of production.67 On
appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the
lease’s habendum clause required “actual production in paying
quantities . . . [and] that the lease terminated when actual production ceased
longer than sixty days.”68
Before the Texas Supreme Court, Anadarko argued that “the habendum
clause’s plain language allows production or the capability of production to
sustain the lease” and that “the cessation-of-production clause only applies
if the well holding the lease becomes incapable of production.”69
Thompson maintained that the “cessation-of-production clause applies
whenever actual production ceases rather than when actual production and
capability of production cease . . . [and that] allowing the capability of
production to sustain the lease indefinitely would render the cessation-of-

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002).
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 553-54.
Id. at 555 (emphasis in original text).
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production clause meaningless.”70 The Texas Supreme Court rejected
Thompson’s contention, stating that “the implied duty to manage and
administer the lease as a reasonably prudent operator, which encompasses
the implied duty to market the gas reasonably, would limit the lessees’
ability to sustain the lease based on a well’s capability of production.” 71
Once it deemed actual production unnecessary to hold the lease so long as
the well remained capable of production, the court defined the phrase
“capable of production in paying quantities” as “a well that will produce in
paying quantities if the well is turned ‘on,’ and it begins flowing, without
additional equipment or repair.”72
This body of Texas case law is one of the most developed in the
country and serves as an important resource for courts deciding similar
cases in areas where the law is less developed. While Texas courts appear
to require more from developers than most other jurisdictions, their
decisions seem motivated by a desire to promote actual, lucrative
development.
2.

Oklahoma

Oklahoma has its own well-developed case law on habendum clauses
that focuses on the capability of production. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma first adopted its “capability rule” in 1958 in McVicker v. Horn,
Robinson & Nathan, where it declined to imply a duty to market oil and gas
during the primary term when the well was readily shown to be capable of
production.73 The habendum clause at issue in this case allowed the lessee
to continue operating “as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is
produced from said lands by the lessee.”74 Although the lessee completed a
well five months before the end of the primary term, it neither sold nor
marketed any gas from it because the lessor refused to allow the lessee to
connect the well to a prospective purchaser’s pipeline.75 The lessee

70. Id. (emphasis in original text).
71. Id. at 557.
72. Id. at 558 (quoting Hyrdocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861 N.W.2d
427, 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1993)).
73. 322 P.2d 410, 412 (Okla. 1958). See also Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 327
(Okla. 1994) (“The Court then rejected the lessors’ argument that production in paying quantities
required the lessees to not only complete a well capable of producing in paying quantities but also
remove the product from the ground and market it. Thus, where a well was completed and
capable of producing in paying quantities within the primary term, the lease continued, so far as
the habendum clause was concerned, as long as the well remained capable of producing in paying
quantities, regardless of any marketing of the product.”).
74. McVicker, 322 P.2d at 412.
75. Id. at 411-12.
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maintained that it could produce gas from the well, but had shut it in rather
than let it waste the gas into the air.76
In resolving this issue, the court cited a 1952 Kansas case, Tate v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Company, which stated:
The great weight of authority, however, appears to be in harmony
with the view that actual production during the primary term is
essential to the extension of the lease beyond that fixed term.
This, at least, is true unless the lease contains some additional
provisions indicating an intent to extend the right to produce
beyond the primary term.77
The court then explained:
No valid fault can be found with the above statement, but was
[sic] say it applies only to production, per se, and as that word
is ordinarily defined (not including marketing). To say that
marketing during the primary term of the lease is essential to
its extension beyond said term, unless the lease contains
additional provisions indicating a contrary intent, is to not
only ignore the distinction between producing and marketing,
which inheres in the nature of the oil and gas business, but it
also ignores the difference between express and implied terms
in lease contracts.78
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma therefore held that the lease did not
terminate for failure to immediately market the gas and that the lessee had a
“reasonable time” in which to do so.79
Next, the court engaged in a detailed examination of the facts,
including the amount of pressure in the well compared to that in a nearby
pipeline and the particulars surrounding the lessee’s efforts to find a buyer
for the gas.80 Finding that the lessee behaved as a prudent operator in light
of the circumstances, the court upheld the lease.81 The court noted,
however, that even the most diligent efforts cannot save a lease “where
there is no reasonable probability that [those efforts] will be successful, or it
appears that others, with less effort, would succeed where they have
failed.”82

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 413.
240 P.2d 465, 468-69 (Kan. 1952) (emphasis added).
McVicker, 322 P.2d at 413 (emphasis in original text).
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414-16.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 416.
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has further refined this rule in
subsequent cases, and it remains good law.83 For example, in the 1994 case
of Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, the court again upheld the rule promulgated
in prior cases that “where a well was completed and capable of producing in
paying quantities within the primary term, the lease continued, so far as the
habendum clause was concerned, as long as the well remained capable of
producing in paying quantities, regardless of any marketing of the
product.”84 In Mason v. Ladd Petroleum, the court examined in detail the
expenses to be deducted from production proceeds when determining
whether a well produced in paying quantities.85 The plaintiffs in that case
contended that the lease on their land expired because the well holding it no
longer produced in paying quantities.86 The habendum clauses at issue
allowed the leases to remain in force “for as long as oil or gas is
produced.”87 Citing its prior decision in Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
the court noted that the term “produced,” when used in a habendum clause,
“denotes in law production in paying quantities . . . [and] means that the
lessee must produce in quantities sufficient to yield a return, however small,
in excess of ‘lifting expenses,’ even though well drilling and completion
costs might never be repaid.”88
Explaining that only expenses directly related to lifting or producing
operations can be offset against production proceeds, the court noted that
these expenses can include the “costs of operating the pumps, pumpers’
salaries, costs of supervision, gross production taxes, royalties payable to
the lessor, electricity, telephone services, repairs.”89 On the other hand, the
court held that such expenses associated with operating a district office,
administrative overhead, and depreciation of items such as casing, tubing,
and a Christmas tree were not relevant to the calculation of lifting
expenses.90 Finding that proceeds exceeded lifting expenses, the court held
the leases at issue remained valid.91

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

For discussion of these subsequent cases, see Boggs, supra note 14, at 350.
869 P.2d 323, 326 (Okla. 1994).
630 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Okla. 1981).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979)).
Id.
Id. at 1286.
Id.
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Kansas

As seen in the Tate case cited by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Kansas
courts require “actual production during the primary term as distinct from
mere exploration or discovery of oil during such term.”92 Kansas courts
also use an objective, mathematical computation to determine when a lease
produces in paying quantities.
In a 1976 decision, the Kansas Supreme Court specifically rejected a
paying quantities analysis based entirely on the lessee’s good-faith
judgment and held that a habendum clause that allowed the lease to
continue “as much longer as oil or gas is found in paying quantities”
required “production in paying quantities.”93 Faced with a lease that
produced steadily from 1916 to 1971, after which the only production
consisted of “free flow” from lines running between eight wells on the
property and a lease tank battery, the court discussed both the subjective
and objective standards of determining how much production is enough.94
It pointed out that many states choose the subjective standard that leaves
this determination solely to the judgment of a reasonably prudent operator
because of a belief that a lessee’s self-interest prevents it from continuing to
operate at a loss.95 However, that test does not protect against the lessee
who wants to preserve his interest in hopes of future discoveries in other
formations or an upturn in market conditions.96 The court explained its
belief that the better approach is to follow those cases that apply an
objective, mathematical computation, which offers the lessor “some
protection when the burdens of the lease far exceed the meager royalty
payments, when they fall below the customary delay rental.”97 After
finding that normal operating costs, in addition to those specifically
required by statute—which included restoring the surface around and
plugging abandoned wells within six months—far outweighed the gross
income from the lease at issue, the court held that the lease expired on its
terms.98

92.
93.
94.
95.
(1964)).
96.
97.
98.

Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 240 P.2d 465, 468 (Kan. 1952).
Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson, 553 P.2d 885, 896-97 (Kan. 1976).
Id. at 897.
Id. (citing 2 KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, §§ 26.7(e), (f), & (g)
Id.
Id.
Id. at 899.

2014]

DEFINING “PRODUCTION IN PAYING QUANTITIES”
4.

399

Louisiana

Louisiana law requires actual production within the primary term to
avoid termination, and the mere existence of a well that is capable of
producing will not save the lease.99 Two older cases illustrate this position,
which has since been codified by the Louisiana Mineral Code. Prior to the
1974 enactment of the Louisiana Mineral Code, Louisiana courts used a
two-prong test to determine whether production from a lease was
adequate.100 Under that test, the courts compared the amount of royalties
being paid to the lessor to the size of other payments due under the lease,
including bonuses, delay rentals, and shut-in royalties. They conducted this
comparison in order to determine whether the royalties constituted “serious
consideration” for the maintenance of the lease—an analysis referred to as
the “objective” standard.”101
In Green v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, the defendant lessee drilled
only one well on the land, which produced so little oil that it normally
would have been abandoned.102 Yet, because the company also operated
other wells in the area, its employees could service the poorly producing
well at little additional cost.103 Standard Oil contended that because it could
produce some quantity of oil from the well without incurring additional
expenses, it should be allowed to do so.104 Citing the company’s stated
intention not to develop the lease any further, the court stated that the lessee
“must either develop with reasonable diligence, or else give up the
lease.”105 The court declared the lease void because the lessee had
“manifestly defaulted on its contract.”106
A similar factual situation gave rise to the dispute in another Louisiana
case, Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co.107 In that case, the lessee moved drilling
machinery onto the property on the very last day of the primary term but
did not actually drill a well until after the primary term expired.108 Once
drilled, the well produced very little.109 Much like in Green, the defendant
99. John M. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the New Louisiana
Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 800 (1976).
100. See generally Noel Estate, Inc., v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953); Brown v. Sugar
Creek Syndicate, 197 So. 583 (La. 1940); Logan v. Tholl Oil Co., Inc., 180 So. 473 (La. 1938).
101. Patrick S. Ottinger, Production in ‘Paying Quantities’—A Fresh Look, 65 LA. L. REV.
635, 638-43 (2005); McCollam, supra note 98, at 814.
102. 84 So. 211, 212 (La. 1920).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 108 So. 314 (La. 1926).
108. Id. at 314.
109. Id.

400

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:383

lessee derived a small profit from the well solely because its other wells in
the vicinity allowed it to service the subject well at little cost.110 The lessee
argued that its ability to derive a small profit from the well relieved it of its
obligation to further develop the property and consequently allowed it to
hold the lease.111 The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and cancelled
the lease; the court rested its conclusion on the fact that the lessee failed to
comply with the lease’s express terms and did not drill a well within one
year.112
After the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Greene and Caldwell,
Louisiana enacted a statute based largely on the Texas Supreme Court’s
ruling in Clifton v. Koontz, which essentially codified existing Louisiana
common law.113 The relevant section of the Louisiana Mineral Code states:
When a mineral lease is being maintained by production of oil or
gas, the production must be in paying quantities. It is considered
to be in paying quantities when production allocable to the total
original right of the lessee to share in production under the lease is
sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent operator to continue
production in an effort to secure a return on his investment or to
minimize any loss.114
The philosophy that a lessee should not be allowed to selfishly hold a
lease for speculative purposes is inherent in this law.115 While Louisiana
courts may still consider lease payment information, the current statutory
scheme specifically limits its use:
[T]he amount of the royalties being paid may be considered only
insofar as it may show the reasonableness of the lessee’s
expectation in continuing production. The amount need not be a
serious or adequate equivalent for continuance of the lease as
compared with the amount of the bonus, rentals, or other sums
paid to the lessor. 116
As a result, Louisiana courts now employ the same reasonable and
prudent operator test used in Texas.117

110. Id. at 315.
111. Id. at 316.
112. Id.
113. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:124 (1974); Ottinger, supra note 100, at 657;
McCollam, supra note 98, at 814.
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:124 (2012). This section took effect on January 1, 1975.
115. Ottinger, supra note 100, at 637.
116. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:125 (2012); see also McCollam, supra note 98, at 814.
117. Ottinger, supra note 100, at 657; McCollam, supra note 98, at 814.
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Alabama

Alabama has less reported case law on habendum clauses than its
neighbors, but it does have an interesting case involving cessation of
production in the secondary term of a lease. In Griffin v. Crutcher-Tufts
Corp., the lessors granted a lease for a term of five years beginning on
January 15, 1975.118 The lessee unitized a portion of the leased acreage and
drilled a productive well in the unit, which produced until December 1979.
Just two weeks before the end of the primary term, on January 2, 1980, the
lessee shut down the well and began “workover” operations.119 These
operations proved unsuccessful, and the lessee abandoned the well on April
10, 1980 and began drilling a new well a month later in another location
within the unit.120 The second well was successful and continued
producing.121 Nonetheless, in September 1980, the lessors notified the
lessee that they considered the lease to have expired, and in September
1981, they filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to declare
that the lessees could not continue to hold the lease.122
At issue before the court was the drilling operations clause contained in
the lease, which provided that the lease would not terminate upon the
cessation of production after the discovery of oil or gas, so long as the
lessee commenced “additional drilling or reworking operations within 60
days.”123 The clause further provided that even if there was no production
at the end of the primary term, the lease could still be held if the lessee was
engaged in drilling or reworking operations when the term expired, so long
as the period of cessation did not exceed sixty days.124 The lessors
contended that the clause did not save the lease because the productive well
was the second well drilled and not the well the lessee attempted to rework
just before the end of the primary term.125
The court noted that the production needed to preserve a lease under a
drilling operations clause must be obtained from the “particular drilling
operations alleged to satisfy the clause.”126 The court also rejected the
defendants’ contention that the shut-in royalties it paid extended the lease
since the shut-in clause specifically stated that it applied during the primary
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

500 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Ala. 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1010.
Id.
Id.
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term.127 Since the gas well at issue was “clearly not capable of production
in commercial quantities,” the court held the lease expired once the
defendants abandoned the first well.128
6.

Arkansas

In 1986, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether an oil and gas lease should be cancelled for failure to produce in
paying quantities. In Turner v. Reynolds Metals Co., Jean Turner leased her
land in 1951 for a term of ten years and “thereafter as long as oil, gas or
other minerals were produced from the land.”129 In 1975, the parties agreed
to extend the lease for an additional period, with both a new primary and
secondary term.130 Having presented evidence of the revenue produced and
the quite limited royalties paid on the lease from 1975 through 1982, lessor
Turner argued that the lease automatically terminated at the end of the
extended secondary term because the well had not produced gas in paying
quantities.131 As a threshold matter, the court stated that a provision in a
lease that requires “production” means “production in paying quantities.”132
The court considered the expense the lessee paid each month to service the
ten wells in the field area where the subject well was located, allocated a
share of that expense to each well, and determined that the lessee lost
money on the well at issue every year during the secondary term.133
Dismissing the fact that the landowner received free gas for her home
during this period as irrelevant, the court held that she was entitled to cancel
the lease since it had failed to produce in paying quantities.134
In another case, Ross Explorations, Inc. v. Freedom Energy, Inc.,, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas considered how much production amounts to
“commercial paying quantities,” which the court said “is determined by
what is profitable to the lessee.”135 In this case, one working interest owner
assigned rights to another after the well holding the lease had been shut in
for several months.136 The assignee, Ross, contended the lease remained in

127. Id. at 1011.
128. Id. at 1012.
129. 721 S.W.2d 626, 626 (Ark. 1986).
130. Id. at 627. The term of this supplemental agreement was “for a period of at least five
years from this date and beyond said five year period for as long as oil and/or gas is produced
from the leased lands or lands unitized therewith.” Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 628.
135. 8 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Ark. 2000).
136. Id. at 513.
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effect, while Freedom Energy, who had meanwhile taken an option to
purchase leases from the lessors, argued the lease expired prior to the Ross
assignment.137 At trial, the court considered evidence for a twenty-four
month period, during which the well operated profitably for eight months
and at a loss for sixteen months, with a net loss of approximately
$607.00.138
On appeal, Ross argued that Freedom Energy failed to meet its burden
of showing the lease ceased to produce in commercial paying quantities
because it improperly included overhead as a cost and that the court erred
by adding non-lifting costs.139 As to the question of what costs ought to be
considered, the court declared that only direct expenses attributable to
operation were relevant, excluding costs such as overhead and those of
drilling and equipping the well.140 The court also rejected Ross’s claim that
the two-year production period the court examined was too short, holding
that the relevant time period is a reasonable one in light of the
circumstances.141 The fact that Ross’s predecessor voluntarily ceased
production four months before assigning the well to Ross offered further
support to the trial court’s finding that the well ceased to produce in the
required quantities, which was affirmed in the Arkansas Supreme Court
decision.142
7.

Mississippi

We found no cases in Mississippi that specifically addressed the
question of what level of production must exist to hold a lease in its
secondary term. A 1959 case, however, took an atypical, plain meaning
approach to the interpretation of the word “production.” In Roberts v.
Corum, the lease at question was “for a term of ten (10) years from [the date
of the lease] (called ‘primary term’) and as long thereafter as oil, gas or
other mineral is produced from said land or lands with which said land is
pooled hereunder.”143 The Mississippi Supreme Court declined to hold that
the production requirement meant production in “paying quantities.”144
Instead of engaging in the typical jurisprudential analysis of production
implying production in paying quantities, the court held that “it is sounder
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 516-17.
112 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1959) (explanatory parenthetical in original text).
Id. at 554.
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policy to adhere to the principles so deeply embedded in our jurisprudence
that the plain and unambiguous language of a contract should be construed
as written.”145 To the court, it could not “now write into that contract the
words ‘production in paying quantities’ without doing violence to the
solemn rights of the parties to make their own agreements.” 146 There is
additional case law on record in Mississippi that clearly allows for some
cessation of production in the secondary term so long as the temporary
stoppage is not for an unreasonable period of time.147
8.

Nebraska

In Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., the lessors sought the surrender of
a lease due to the failure of the defendant to produce oil and gas in paying
quantities during the primary term of the lease.148 The lease had a standard
term, but also had an additional section that provided “if, after discovery of
oil, liquid hydrocarbons, gas or their respective constituent products, or any
of them, the production thereof should cease, this lease shall not terminate
if lessee commences additional drilling or reworking operations.”149 The
lessor contended that the word “production,” as used in that clause or
anywhere it existed in the lease, meant “production in paying quantities.”150
The court cited multiple cases where courts addressed the question of
whether to imply a “paying quantities” requirement where one was not
specifically stated, including Garcia v. King, but noted that none of those
cases related to the primary term of the lease.151 This case, therefore, did
not turn on the meaning of “paying quantities” because the dispute occurred
while the lease was still in its primary term. However, the court’s lengthy
discussion of the Garcia case may be read as an indicator of its position on
the question as it pertains to the secondary term. Yet, at the same time, the
court also noted that “courts are not at liberty to rewrite the contract made
by the parties, nor should the courts add language to that used by the parties
and thus change the plain expressed intention of the parties as set out in the
contract.”152 Therefore, how a Nebraska court might come down on a case

145. Id. at 555. Without directly citing to case law, the court prefaced that holding by
stating that it was “cognizant of the fact that many courts hold to the contrary” concerning the
meaning of the word “production.” Id.
146. Id.
147. Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp., 119 So. 2d 759, 762 (Miss. 1960).
148. 89 N.W.2d 245, 248-49 (Neb. 1958).
149. Id. at 252.
150. Id. at 254.
151. Id. at 255 (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942)).
152. Id.
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centering on habendum clause interpretation remains left open to
interpretation.
B. EASTERN STATES
While courts in the east calculate a lessee’s profits and losses the same
way as those in the Midcontinent, they ultimately defer to the good-faith
determination of the lessee as to whether continued operations are justified.
1.

Pennsylvania

With one of the longest histories of commercial oil and gas
development in the world,153 it is no surprise that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was the first to tackle the paying quantities question. The “goodfaith” test first introduced in the 1899 case of Young v. Forest Oil Co. set a
definitional standard for what constitutes paying quantities—that a well
must produce some amount of oil or gas greater than the amount needed to
cover operating costs—and offered a method for determining whether that
standard was met.154 The resulting lessee-centered focus on good faith
became the basis for oil and gas drilling regimes throughout the
Appalachian basin and remains good law today.
In Young, the landowner filed suit after the lessee refused to drill
additional wells on his land and asked the court to either declare “a
forfeiture of the lease for failure to develop the land” or to require the lessee
to sink an additional well on his property.155 Although the lessee drilled a
total of five wells on Young’s fifty-three acre farm, four of which produced
oil, Young focused on the area of the farm containing no wells to support
his argument that “oil was no longer produced ‘in paying quantities.’”156
The court declared the “real question” in the case was whether the
lessee’s “omission to put a well in that portion of the land was fraudulent,”
but it found “not a scintilla of evidence” to support that contention.157 A
153. The first American commercial oil well was the famous Drake Well, drilled pursuant to
a lease dated December 30, 1857. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at § 601.1. The
surrounding Oil Creek valley was the world’s largest oil producer from 1859 through 1873.
154. 45 A. 121, 122-23 (Pa. 1899). In another section of the opinion, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the fact that since:
The operator, who has assumed the obligations of the lease, has put his money and
labor into the undertaking . . . [he] is entitled to follow his own judgment. If that is
exercised in good faith, a different opinion by the lessor, or the experts, or the court, or
all combined, is of no consequence, and will not authorize a decree interfering with
him.
Id. at 122.
155. Id. at 121.
156. Id. at 122.
157. Id.
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well produces in paying quantities, the court explained, if it “pays a profit,
even a small one, over the operating expenses,” even though it “may never
repay its cost, and the operation as a whole may result in a loss.”158 Noting
that the lessee must be allowed to reduce its loss by profits, however small,
the court found the lease valid, holding that “the phrase, ‘paying quantities,’
therefore is to be construed with reference to the operator, and by his
judgment when exercised in good faith.”159
In the 1977 case of Pemco Gas, Inc. v. Bernardi, the Armstrong
County Court of Common Pleas interpreted a habendum clause that allowed
a lease to continue for “as long after commencement of operations as said
land is operated for the exploration or production of gas and oil, or as gas
and oil is found in paying quantities thereon.”160 Although the analysis in
Pemco focuses largely on “commencement of operations” language
particular to that lease and is not binding law, we include it here because it
shows a tendency for courts to allow a lessee to proceed when the court
believes the leasehold is capable of producing.
The original lessee assigned the subject lease to Pemco, a third-party
operator, about six months prior to the expiration of the ten-year primary
term.161 Pemco then surveyed the site, began negotiating with the lessors
and a neighbor about the location of the well site and rights of way, and
hired third parties to excavate and drill the well.162 Just days before the
expiration of the primary term, workers cleared the property and brought
several pieces of conductor pipe to the site.163 Delays at another site
prevented the drill rig from arriving until September 1, the day the primary
term expired.164 That very day, the lessors executed a new lease on the
property with a different oil and gas firm and informed Pemco that they
believed the prior lease had terminated.165
The court divided its analysis into two issues. First, what types of acts
qualify as the “commencement of operations?” And second, did the lessee
commence operations with the good-faith intent to drill a well?166 Noting
that Pemco began negotiations nearly three months before the expiration of
the lease and continued its preparations until the last day of the lease, the
court determined that Pemco “commenced operations within the generally
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 123.
5 Pa. D. & C. 3d 85, 87 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1977).
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 93.
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accepted meaning of that phrase.”167 The court explained, “if a lessee
commences a well within the primary term of a lease and carries on the
drilling operations diligently and in good faith, although he does not
actually complete the well and secure production until after the end of the
primary term, the lease remains in force . . . . “168 Describing the law on the
issue of what constitutes “commencement of operations” as fairly clear, the
court noted that “actual drilling is not necessary” and “physical acts
normally required to be done prior to the commencement of actual drilling,
if done in good faith, are sufficient to constitute the commencement of a
well or drilling operations.”169 Finding no evidence of bad faith, the court
held that the lease continued into its secondary term as a result of Pemco’s
“good faith commencement of operations in preparation for the actual
drilling of a gas well.”170
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
reaffirmed and expanded upon the subjective, good-faith test first
promulgated in Young v. Forest Oil and specifically declined to adopt the
objective standard employed by Texas and other midcontinent courts. In
T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, two lessees filed a declaratory
judgment action against landowner Ann Jedlicka when she objected to their
plans to drill four additional wells on her land.171 Jedlicka acquired her
seventy-acre tract of land in 1979, subject to the terms of an existing 1928
oil and gas lease.172 The lease’s habendum clause allowed the lessee to
continue operating “for a term of two years, and as long thereafter as oil or
gas is produced in paying quantities . . . .”173
At trial, Jedlicka argued that the lessee failed to maintain continuous
production in paying quantities because it had sustained a loss of $40 in
1959.174 The lessee maintained that production from the wells amounted to
production in paying quantities because their profits exceeded operating
expenses, and they continued to operate those wells in a good-faith effort to
turn a profit.175 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Jedlicka’s
petition for appeal to consider whether the lower court misapplied
Pennsylvania’s seminal case on the issue, Young v. Forest Oil, by “holding

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 100.
42 A.3d 261, 264 (Pa. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that Pennsylvania employs a purely subjective test to determine whether an
oil or gas lease has produced ‘in paying quantities.’”176
At trial, and again on appeal, Jedlicka asserted that the Young decision
called for an objective, mathematical calculation of profits minus operating
expenses (sometimes referred to as “lifting expenses”).177 The operator’s
subjective, good-faith judgment only comes into play, she argued, where a
lease is producing in paying quantities (making a profit) but may not offset
its total operating expenses.178 In making this argument, Jedlicka appears to
have been urging the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to adopt the
prudent-operator standard used in Texas and other mid-continent states.
Specifically, Jedlicka claimed that because the lessees incurred a net loss in
1959, the lease lapsed into a tenancy at will, which was terminable by the
lessor at any time.179 The lessees, on the other hand, contended that even
courts in jurisdictions that embrace an objective standard “have explicitly
held that the term to be used in assessing the performance of the lease
should be one long enough to ‘provide the information which a prudent
operator would take into account in [deciding] whether to continue or
abandon operation.’”180
Rejecting Jedlicka’s contention that a one-year period of loss justifies
the conclusion that a well failed to produce in paying quantities, the court
held that profits must be measured over a reasonable period of time.181 The
question of what amounts to a “reasonable” time period requires a careful
review of the individual circumstances of each case and may “be driven by
consideration of the good faith judgment of the operator.”182 Although the
court declined to establish a bright-line rule regarding what constitutes a
reasonable time period, it provided some guidance, noting that other courts
found a two-year period reasonable while a thirteen-year period was not.183
The court also explained the rationale behind its preferred subjective
standard:
The operator, who has assumed the obligations of the lease, has
put his money and labor into the undertaking, and . . . is entitled to
follow his own judgment. If that is exercised in good faith, a
different opinion by the lessor, or the experts, or the court, or all
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 266.
Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id.
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combined, is of no consequence, and will not authorize a decree
interfering with him.184
The court further explained:
Where . . . production on a well has been marginal or
sporadic, such that, over some period, the well’s profits do not
exceed its operating expenses, a determination of whether the
well has produced in paying quantities requires consideration
of the operator’s good faith judgment in maintaining operation
of the well. In assessing whether an operator has exercised
his judgment in good faith in this regard, a court must
consider the reasonableness of the time period during which
the operator has continued his operation of the well in an
effort to reestablish the well’s profitability.185
Noting that Jedlicka presented no proof that the lessees acted in bad
faith in continuing to operate under the lease, the court upheld the lease.186
2.

New York

Courts in New York also defer to an operators’ good-faith judgment in
deciding how much profit justifies the continued development of a
particular leasehold, although New York has few cases on the issue.187
3.

Kentucky

A 1934 Kentucky Court of Appeals case stemming from a claim by a
lessee looking to abandon an unprofitable lease illustrates a similar
deference to lessees’ good-faith judgment.188 In Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby,
the lessor filed suit seeking royalties payable under a 1916 oil and gas lease
that allowed the lessee to continue operating “as long as gas or oil is found
in paying quantities on said premises,” with payment for gas contingent
upon the additional provision that gas be found “in sufficient quantities to
transport.”189 Although the lessee failed to drill any wells on the Riggsby

184. Id. at 269 (quoting Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 122 (Pa. 1899)).
185. Id. at 276.
186. Id. at 278.
187. See, e.g., Peckham v. Dunning, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 895 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
188. Habendum clause language has not always been viewed as a constraint on the ability of
a lessee to continue operating a lease after the primary term. In the early days of oil and gas
development, landowners sometimes argued that the “so long thereafter” language required a
lessee to continue operating a lease that the lessee might otherwise choose to abandon. See, e.g.,
Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby, 67 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 1934).
189. Id. at 31.

410

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:383

land, it operated multiple wells on neighboring lands.190 After contracting
with a distribution company to sell gas from all of the surrounding wells
and operating at a loss for several months, the lessee cancelled the contract
and plugged several wells.191 The lessee then removed its pipeline from the
Riggsbys’ land and sought to abandon the lease.192 Experts testified that the
gas underlying the Riggsby property alone would have been too little to
transport and certainly not enough to turn a profit given the distance
between the well and existing pipelines.193 Despite this, the lessors argued
that the lease terms obligated the lessee to either pay them $200 per year or
drill one or two wells on the premises.194
The court acknowledged the importance of allowing an experienced
operator to determine whether a particular well produces enough gas to
market in light of “the distance to the market, the expense of marketing, and
every similar circumstance.”195 Noting that the object of leasing oil and gas
is to “secure the oil or gas beneath the surface,” and that “the judgment of
an experienced operator or lessee, if exercised in good faith, will prevail as
against that of a lessor without experience,” the court held that a lessee may
properly abandon a lease once it establishes the absence of gas beneath the
surface, or that gas does not exist in paying quantities.196
In the 1923 decision of Reynolds v. White Plains Oil & Gas Co., the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky declined to cancel a lease where the three
wells drilled produced only one barrel of oil every other day and the
habendum clause allowed the lease to continue “so long thereafter as oil and
gas are produced or operations are continued thereon.”197 While the lessor
argued that the lease expired because it failed to produce in paying
quantities, the court countered:
The expression “in paying quantities” is not employed in the
contract, but had it been so employed in the contract lessor would
be in no better condition for the general rule is, as laid down in
Thornton on Oil & Gas, sections, 148, 149 and 151, that the lessee
who at his own expense drills wells, equips them and operates

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
250 S.W. 975, 975 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923) (emphasis added).
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them, has the exclusive right to determine when a well is
producing oil or gas or both in paying quantities. 198
The court explained that its decision protected the good-faith lessee
who prosecuted work for development with reasonable diligence.199
In Enfield v. Woods, the well drilled produced some oil, but even the
lessee admitted the amount was very small.200 The lessee attempted to drill
deeper, but even then it produced only “mere scum or showing of oil on the
barrels or tank into which the well was pumped; that there was not enough
oil to stain the ground.”201 The lessee contended that he could hold the
lease because the habendum clause allowed it to continue “as long
thereafter as oil and gas, or either, is produced.”202
While the court acknowledged that the lease did not require the lessee
to produce oil in paying quantities, it stated that the lessee is required to
produced oil and gas “in such quantities as to be susceptible of division, so
as to pay the landowner a royalty, even though small. A mere showing of
oil manifestly is not sufficient even though produced. The production must
be tangible and substantial, but it need not be great.”203 The court
acknowledged the position that merely requiring oil and gas to be produced
leaves room for a lease to continue where production exists but does not
pay.204 Yet, the court went on to say that the general rule “is to hold the
expression ‘oil well’ or ‘gas well’ as used in a lease contract to mean an oil
well or gas well which can be profitably operated as such.”205 Thus, the
court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the well was a non-producer
and therefore the lease expired.206
In the 1946 case of Young v. Dunn, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
made it clear that the lessee need not actually sell gas to hold a lease,
although its failure to exercise reasonable diligence in marketing gas could
amount to abandonment.207 The Kentucky Court of Appeals reiterated this
position in 2000, stating: “consummation of a sale is not necessarily the

198. Id. at 976.
199. Id.
200. 248 S.W. 842, 842 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923). The Enfield decision is also noteworthy as
one of the decisions cited by the Texas Supreme Court in arriving at its holding in the seminal
case of Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1942).
201. Enfield, 248 S.W. at 843.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 843.
206. Id.
207. 194 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Ky. 1946).
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determining factor of whether the lessee has marketed the gas.”208 Rather, a
court must examine:
[A]ll of the circumstances, such as the absence of a market and the
diligence of a lessee in seeking a market, the failure of the lessor to
make a demand, the acceptance by a lessor of other benefits under
the lease, whether it was necessary to make abnormal expenditures
to market the product, and whether the delay was to gain better
marketing terms.209
Like the case law history of Illinois and West Virginia discussed more
particularly below, this line of Kentucky cases illustrates that the mere
discovery position taken by the Kentucky courts early on appears to have
softened to a position that more closely resembles the capability rule
adopted by Oklahoma courts.
4.

West Virginia

Like Kentucky, West Virginia courts once required very little
production to extend a lease. South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass210 illustrates
the “mere discovery” position the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia took in the early twentieth century. The habendum clause at issue
in Snodgrass permitted the lessee to continue operating after the ten-year
primary term for “as long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is
produced therefrom.”211 With the end of the primary term less than a week
away, South Penn Oil Company discovered oil on the property in trace
amounts.212 On the very day the primary term expired, South Penn shot a
well.213 One week later, it began pumping the well and continued to do so
for some time.214 Meanwhile, after attempting to terminate the lease by
refusing to accept the final delay rental payments, the lessors granted new
leases on the property to different developers.215 The lessors and the new
lessees then joined forces to oust South Penn, who had already paid the
lessors around $2,000 in rentals and drilled a well to a depth of 2,038
feet.216 South Penn filed suit against the lessors and the new lessees.

208. Hiroc Programs, Inc. v. Robertson, 40 S.W.3d 373, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
Davis v. Cramer, 837 P.2d 218, 222 (Colo. App. 1992)).
209. Id.
210. 76 S.E. 961, 964 (W. Va. 1912).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 963.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 964.
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Analyzing the lease language in light of the spirit and purpose of the
contract between the parties, the court noted that the habendum clause
exists to allow a lessee acting diligently, skillfully, and in good faith to
continue operating and to attempt to recover its costs.217 Given that
purpose, the court said, simply discovering oil—even with only trace
amounts of production—vests an interest and gives way to a continued right
to explore and produce that oil.218 The lessee takes “enormous risks and
burdens” by drilling a well, and “[a]dherence to the strict letter of the
extension clause would make no allowance for [delays], and inflict
disastrous losses upon diligent and honest lessees in many instances—a
consequence plainly not within the intent of either party.”219 The court
declared the lessee’s decision not to drill until the last quarter of the primary
term well within its rights under the contract and held that the discovery of
oil during the primary term extended the lease into its secondary term.220
Just five years after deciding Snodgrass, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia noted the importance of being able to actually market the
oil and gas produced from the leasehold. That case, Barbour, Stedman &
Co. v. Tompkins,221 involved a lease for a primary term of five years and “as
long thereafter as oil or gas is produced therefrom in paying quantities.” 222
Three to four days before the expiration of the primary term, the lessee
discovered gas.223 The well produced 100,000 to 500,000 cubic feet of gas
per day, which the lessee then sold in the local gas markets.224 The
landowner sued to cancel the lease, arguing that the output did not amount
to “paying quantities.”225
The operative question, the court said, becomes “not how much may be
derived from a sale of the gas, but rather whether it may be sold in the
market for consumption as fuel with reasonable expectation of profitable
returns in excess of costs and expenses.”226 Again stating that the phrase
“in paying quantities” must be considered in light of the lessee’s good-faith
judgment, the court held that the lessor cannot forfeit the lease merely

217. Id. at 967. For further discussion of the court’s rational, see KUNTZ, supra note 8, at §
26.7(a).
218. Snodgrass, 76 S.E. at 967.
219. Id.
220. Id.at 967-68. The court stated that it was important to make an “allowance for accident
or miscalculation as to ability or error or judgment as to conditions . . . .” Id. at 968.
221. 93 S.E. 1038 (W. Va. 1917).
222. Id. at 1038.
223. Id. at 1038-39.
224. Id. at 1040.
225. Id. at 1039-40.
226. Id. at 1040.
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because “he thinks the quantity of gas discovered therein was not sufficient
to constitute a paying well . . . .”227
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia pointed out the importance of the operator’s profit in determining
whether a lease is held by production. In Goodwin v. Wright, the defendant
contended that its lease remained valid during its secondary term solely
because the well on the property supplied the lessors with gas for their
home.228 Having granted a lease in 1961 for a primary term of ten years
and “as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from the
said lands,” Paul and Dorothy Goodwin sought to terminate the lease in
1974, claiming it had expired on its terms.229 Both parties agreed that the
lessee had not produced oil or gas on the land for four years and that the
lessors received no rental payments or royalties after “1968 or 1969,” at
least one year before the lessee assigned the lease to the defendant.230 In
turn, the operator argued that the benefit the Goodwins received in the form
of free gas for their home justified extending the term of the lease.231
Revisiting the question of whether “produced” means “produced in
paying quantities,” the court cited Garcia v. King, noting that the
landowner’s purpose in executing a lease “is to have the oil and gas on the
leased premises produced and marketed so that he may receive his royalty
therefrom, and the purpose of the lessee is to discover and produce oil and
gas in such quantities as will yield him a profit.”232 Turning to the lease at
issue, the court pointed out that the lessee not only failed to properly pay
either rental or royalty, but that it also made no attempt to produce or
market the oil or gas.233 The court emphasized the fact that “‘[t]he
objective of the lease is not merely to have oil or gas flow from the ground
but to obtain production that is commercially profitable to both parties.’”234
Absent paying production, the court noted, the lessee cannot recover its
drilling costs. Further, the court pointed out, the lessor contemplates more
than the receipt of an ancillary benefit such as free gas for domestic use
when granting a lease.235 Stating that the production required would result

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
255 S.E.2d 924, 925 (W. Va. 1979).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 926 (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942)).
Id. at 927.
Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at § 605).
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in a royalty payment to the lessor, the court held that the lease had expired
on its terms. 236
C. MIDWESTERN STATES
When addressing questions involving the habendum clause, courts in
the Midwest often rely on established law from the Midcontinent or the
East.
1.

Illinois

In Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., another of the cases discussed by the
Texas Supreme Court in its Garcia holding,237 the Supreme Court of
Illinois considered the issue of requisite production under a lease where the
habendum clause did not require production in paying quantities, but rather
allowed the lessee to continue operating for five years and “so long
thereafter as oil or gas is produced thereon.”238 Less than a week before the
expiration of the primary term, the lessee drilled a well.239 The well
produced twelve barrels of oil per day for the first two days and
insignificant amounts thereafter.240 The court stated that the well’s
continual oil production, albeit “so small as to make the venture
unprofitable,” satisfied the requirements of “the strict letter of the lease,”
and the court held that it had not expired by its terms.241
In 1980, an Illinois Court of Appeals again analyzed a lease where the
habendum clause lacked a “paying quantities” requirement in Doty v. Key
Oil, Inc..242 Key Oil discovered gas, which it flared, but produced no oil.243
The lessors demanded release of the lease, and then Key Oil shut in the
well.244 At trial, Key Oil blamed its lack of production on the fact that the
distance from the well to a pipeline prevented it from profitably marketing
the gas.245 The trial court “commented that the flaring of the well appeared
to be inconsistent with an intention to produce gas at some later date” and
held that the lease had expired on its terms.246 On appeal, Key Oil argued

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
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Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 581-82 (Tex. 1942).
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that its payment of shut-in royalties saved the lease.247 The court pointed
out that shut-in clauses exist to extend leases where the lessee discovers gas
in paying quantities during the primary term but finds no market for it.248
Noting that the prior decision in Gillespie contradicted the position of other
courts—that “the production necessary to extend a lease must be in paying
quantities”—the court distinguished the Gillespie decision rather than
overruling it.249 While the habendum clause in this case did not require
production in paying quantities, a provision referring to the shut-in clause
provided that “if such payment or tender is made, this lease shall continue
in force and it shall be considered that gas is being produced from the
leased premises in paying quantities.”250 When read together, the court
said, these clauses revealed the parties’ intent to require production in
paying quantities to extend the lease under the habendum clause.251 Since
Key Oil flared the only gas produced, and it found no oil at all, the court
explained that “the lease was not extended under the habendum clause for
the simple reason that there was no production whatsoever, in any accepted
sense of the term.”252
An Illinois Court of Appeals once again distinguished Gillespie and
specifically declined to overrule it in 1984 when considering similar lease
language in Pieszchalski v. Oslanger.253 The lessees in that case relied on
Gillespie at trial, and the trial court declared that Gillespie no longer “states
the law in Illinois.”254 The Illinois Court of Appeals disagreed, again
distinguishing the case by saying: “it does not stand for the proposition
these defendants attribute to it, i.e., that any production, however meager, is
sufficient in any event to extend an oil and gas lease beyond the primary
term under a habendum clause not requiring production of oil or gas in
paying quantities.”255 In Gillespie, the court explained, the lessee
continually produced oil from the well and the habendum clause allowed
the lease to continue “so long thereafter as oil or gas was ‘produced.’”256
In the lease at issue in Pieszchalski, the lessee pumped the single well
until it filled the saltwater pit and then shut it down.257 Although the well
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
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produced some oil, no one received any proceeds from the sale of oil.258
Noting that lease construction requires courts to give effect to parties’
intent, the court explained that the lease must also be interpreted in light of
its spirit and purpose:
[T]o secure development of the property for the mutual benefit of
the parties . . . Obviously, if the lease could no longer be operated
at a profit, there were no fruits for them to reap. The lessors
should not be required to suffer a continuation of the lease after the
expiration of the primary period merely for speculation purposes
on the part of the lessees.259
The court upheld the trial court’s finding that the lease failed to
produce and therefore terminated on its terms.260
While Gillespie remains good law in Illinois, in several subsequent
cases, Illinois courts have taken great pains to explain that the rationale
applied in Gillespie was fact-specific. Furthermore, the reasoning in these
later decisions aligns with that of other courts across the country that
require payment of royalties to the lessor as a minimum standard for a lease
to be held by production.
2.

Indiana

In the 1905 case of Manhattan Oil Co. v. Carrell, the Supreme Court of
Indiana interpreted a lease that required the lessee to drill additional wells
every ninety days after completing the first well until they completed five
wells “if oil is found in paying quantities.”261 After drilling one producing
well, the lessee remained on the land and continued to work that same well
for over three years.262 The lessor then sued to recover the penalty due for
the lessee’s failure to drill additional wells.263 The jury instructions used at
the trial essentially stated the following:
[I]f oil was found in the test or first well in a sufficient quantity to
pay a profit, however small, in excess of the cost of producing it,
excluding the cost of drilling the well and of equipment, then oil
was found in paying quantities, within the meaning of the contract,
and the defendant would be required to drill the four additional
wells, even though it became manifest that the oil to be obtained
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
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would not repay first cost, and the enterprise, as a whole, result in
a loss to the defendant. 264
Examining the contract in light of the parties’ likely purpose and intent,
the court stated that additional wells were to be drilled only if oil were
found in such quantity that ordinarily prudent persons could “expect a
reasonable profit on the full sum required to be expended in the prosecution
of the enterprise.”265 This determination must be left to the lessee, the court
said, and made in good faith based upon sound business principles.266
3.

Michigan

The leases at issue in the 1982 case of Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline
Co. v. Michigan National Bank, which was decided by the Michigan Court
of Appeals, formed part of a gas storage field initially operated by the
Michigan Consolidated Gas Company.267 After an interstate transmission
company applied to the Michigan Public Service Commission to condemn
certain parts of the storage field, the operator cut back production to the
amount needed to operate heaters at a compressor station and provide free
gas for domestic use in several homes.268 With a condemnation action
pending, the lessors challenged the validity of the underlying leases, which
contained habendum clauses allowing the leases to continue “as long
thereafter as oil and gas; or either of them, is produced by lessee from said
land or from a communitized unit.”269
The appellants in the case contended that “Consolidated acted as a
reasonable and prudent operator in deciding to cut back its market of gas”
from the storage field in light of the impending condemnation action.270
Relying on the factors set forth in Clifton v. Koontz as to various matters to
be considered under that standard, the court explained that the lessor must
establish two things to terminate a lease: “first, that the operator/lessee was
not making a profit from the operation of the field; second that a reasonably
prudent operator would not have continued to operate the field under
similar circumstances.”271 The court agreed that a reasonable and prudent
operator would have ceased marketing the gas, since leaving the gas in
place and waiting for the condemnation award meant it could obtain a profit
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 1086.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
324 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
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Id. at 544.
Id. at 545 (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959)).
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at fair market value just the same as if it sold the gas at market.272 This
standard allows an operator to act in its best interests, the court explained,
“so long as the interests of the lessor are not substantially impaired,” and
the lessors in this case presented no evidence of that.273 The dissenting
judge contended that the reasonable and prudent operator standard did not
apply because the operator failed to make shut-in royalty payments.274 The
majority rejected this argument, finding instead that production continued
during this time and that any temporary cessation that occured was
reasonable.275
4.

Ohio

Ohio jurisprudence reflects a certain deference to a lessee’s good-faith
judgment regarding how much production justifies continued operations but
with limitations that hew toward the “actual production” approach favored
by Texas courts.276 Take, for example, a 1926 Court of Appeals decision.
Having obtained a lease for a primary term of ten years and “as much
longer as oil or gas is found in paying quantities,” the lessee-defendant in
Tedrow v. Shaffer drilled a well not long after taking the lease and pumped
a small amount of oil from it.277 For the next seven years, the lessee paid
delay rentals to the lessor but failed to further develop the oil and gas.278
One month prior to the expiration of the primary term, the lessee assigned
the lease to a developer who promptly entered the premises, built roads, and
began pumping oil from the well on the very day the primary term
expired.279
Equating the term “found” with the term “produced,” the Court of
Appeals explained that “production or finding of oil is a condition
precedent to the extension of the definite term.”280 The lessee cannot
simply produce oil in paying quantities on the last day of the term; rather,
“he must have been producing it in paying quantities for some substantial or
reasonable time prior to the final day of such term, so that it clearly appears,
when the end of such term comes, that he is in good faith actually finding
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oil in paying quantities.”281 Deeming the lessee’s last-ditch efforts
inadequate, the court held that the lease had expired.282
The holding in Tedrow remains good law in Ohio. In the 1992 decision
of American Energy Services, Inc. v. Lekan, the Court of Appeals
reaffirmed its decision in Tedrow, stating unequivocally that a lessee’s
good-faith belief that a well is capable of producing in paying quantities “is
not enough to hold a lease in its secondary term. The law of Ohio requires
that potential production be translated into actual production.”283 In that
case, the court focused on the fact that the lessee never connected the well
to a pipeline and the well produced no oil or gas whatsoever over a period
of seventeen years.284 The court also discussed the implied duty to market
and explained that the existence of a shut-in royalty clause merely modifies
this obligation but “does not negate the duty to use due diligence to sell the
production.”285
In Litton v. Geisler, the Court of Appeals characterized the production
required to extend a lease beyond its primary term as “that quantity which
will bring a reasonable pecuniary return in excess of the cost of production,
regardless of any particular amount of profit derivable from the operation of
the well.”286 It explained that the lessee may determine what quantity
satisfies this standard, so long as he exercises his judgment in good faith.287
The court explained that:
[T]he fact it is questionable whether oil wells on land held under a
lease operative only so long as oil or gas should be found in
paying quantities will ever yield a reasonable profit on the
investment is not sufficient ground for vacating the lease; in the
absence of fraud, the lessee is the sole judge of this question, and
as long as he can make a profit therefrom he will be permitted to
do so. The mere fact that a lessee under such a lease has failed to
operate the wells for some time, will not be ground for vacating
such lease, where such lessee shows good and sufficient reason
why it has been impracticable for him to do so.288

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 598 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
284. Id. at 1321.
285. Id. at 1322.
286. 76 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (quoting Barbour, Stedman & Co. v.
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In Blausey v. Stein, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained that the
lessee’s ability to minimize his costs should “inure to his benefit in a
determination of whether a well produces in paying quantities” and that the
lessee should be “allowed to attempt to recoup his initial investment for as
long as he continues to derive any financial benefit from production.”289
The property owner in Blausey asked the court to find the lease on her land
void for failure to produce in paying quantities.290 To support her case, the
landowner contended that the lessee operated at a loss for six years because
his expenses, including all the labor needed to produce oil from the lease,
exceeded the income from the well.291
In addressing this claim, the court explained that “the term ‘paying
quantities’ . . . has been construed by the weight of authority to mean
‘quantities of oil or gas sufficient to yield a profit, even small, to the lessee
over operating expenses, even though the drilling costs, or equipping costs,
are not recovered, and even though the undertaking as a whole may thus
result in a loss.’”292 The court excluded the lessee’s labor from total
operating expenses in the calculation of profits versus costs, which left him
with a small income from the sale of oil from the well and satisfied the
requirement that oil or gas be “found in paying quantities.”293
5.

North Dakota

In the case of Greenfield v. Thill, in which the Supreme Court of North
Dakota held that a temporary cessation of production during the secondary
term does not automatically terminate a defeasible-term interest acquired by
deed, the court explained in a footnote that “it is generally recognized that
‘found in paying quantities’ is synonymous with ‘produced in paying
quantities.’”294 We found no subsequent reported cases in which the North
Dakota Supreme Court explained its view as to the amount of production
required to meet this standard or the appropriate test to be applied to see if
the standard has been met.
6.

South Dakota

The Supreme Court of South Dakota discussed the production needed
to carry a lease into its secondary term in Cleveland Stone Co. v.
289. 400 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ohio 1980).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting Douglas Hale Gross, Annotation, Meaning of ‘Paying Quantities’ in Oil
and Gas Lease, 43 A.L.R.3d 8 (1972)).
293. Id.
294. 521 N.W.2d 87, 92 n.1 (N.D. 1994).
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Hollingsworth.295 The defendant lessee cited a West Virginia case, South
Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass,296 which we discussed in detail hereinabove,297
for the proposition that the mere discovery of minerals during the primary
term could carry a lease into its secondary term so long as the lessee
diligently continued operations.298 The court observed that the trial court
seemed “to have been of the opinion that a mere showing of oil was not
sufficient, but tangible and substantial production was necessary to extend
the term of the lease.”299 However, both the trial court and the Supreme
Court of South Dakota decided the case on other grounds.300
D. WESTERN STATES
Western states have the least developed case law on this issue. As a
result, we have included cases that address the issue rather narrowly.
1.

California

We found very few Supreme Court cases in California regarding
habendum clause interpretation,301 although several lower courts have
addressed the issue.302 For example, in 1932, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that a well produced in paying quantities “as long as the
returns from a well drilled in accordance with the lease exceed the cost of
operation after completion, although the well may never repay the drilling
costs, and the operation as a whole may result in a loss.”303 In 1990, the
California Court of Appeals addressed the question of the proper time
period to consider when assessing whether a well produced in paying
quantities. In Lough v. Coal Oil, Inc., the owner of two lots in Long Beach
leased her property to Coal Oil in 1951 for a primary term of twenty years
and “so long thereafter as . . . [hydrocarbons were produced] therefrom.”304
Lough sued to quiet title in 1982, arguing, among other things, that the
295. 262 N.W. 171, 172 (S.D. 1935).
296. 76 S.E. 961 (W. Va. 1912).
297. See discussion supra Part II(B)(4).
298. Hollingsworth, 262 N.W. at 172.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 244 P.2d 895 (Cal. 1952);
Dabney v. Edwards, 53 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1935).
302. See Lough v. Coal Oil, 266 Cal. Rptr. 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); S. Pac. Land Co. v.
Westlake Farms, Inc., 233 Cal. Rptr. 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Montana-Fresno Oil Co. v. Powell,
33 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963); Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 191 P.2d 129 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1948).
303. Denker v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 56 F.2d 725, 727 (10th Cir. 1932).
304. 266 Cal. Rptr. 611, 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (ellipses and brackets appearing in
original text).
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1951 lease had terminated for failure to produce in paying quantities.305 At
trial, the facts showed that during an eighteen-month period from July 1981
to December 1982, Coal Oil experienced a loss of $15,846.62 and during a
fifty-one-month period from January 1983 to March 1987, the company
again suffered serious losses.306 Finding these periods of time adequate to
provide a reasonable financial picture of the lease’s profitability, the Court
of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the lease terminated for
failure to produce in sufficient paying quantities.307
In San Mateo Community College District v. Half Moon Bay
Partnership, the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District
considered exactly what type of drilling activity was needed to extend a
lease past its primary term.308 The habendum clause in the lease at issue
provided that the lessee could continue “its operation past the termination
date as to each well producing or being drilled at the time and in respect to
which lessee is not in default. Lessee’s right to continued operation as to
said well(s) shall continue so long as such well(s) shall produce oil in
paying quantities.”309 The court held that language of the lease required
either a producing well or active drilling of a new well at the end of the
primary term in order to extend the lease.310
2.

Montana

In Montana, “oil and gas leases are to be construed liberally in favor of
the lessor and strictly against the lessee.”311 The Supreme Court of
Montana stopped short of requiring oil and gas to be sold in order to extend
a lease into its secondary term in a 1973 decision where the habendum
clause allowed the lease to continue “as long thereafter as oil or gas, or
either of them, is produced . . . .”312 The parties amended the original lease
several times, and eventually the habendum clause read: “as long as oil or
gas was produced and the lessee exercises reasonable diligence in
development.”313 The first well drilled had gas flow of 250,000 to 500,000
cubic feet per day that was never sold commercially, and the lessee began
drilling a second well on the last day of the term. 314
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 619.
76 Cal. Rptr.2d 287, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 294.
Christian v. A. A. Oil Corp., 506 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Mont. 1973).
Id.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1372.
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The court stated that the test for “whether there was sufficient
production or whether the lessee was acting with reasonable diligence in
producing and marketing the gas from the leased lands is the diligence
which would be exercised by the ordinary prudent operator having regard to
the interests of both lessor and lessee.”315 It further noted that “mere
discovery of oil and gas is not sufficient,” but that the discovery of gas in
commercial quantities during the primary term satisfied the “thereafter”
provision “for a period of time, and thereby extends the lease into the
secondary term. After the mineral is discovered the lessee is required to use
reasonable diligence in operating the well and marketing the product within
a reasonable time.”316 Once into the secondary term, the court noted
production must be in “paying quantities,” defined as such quantities as will
pay a profit over operating expenses.317 Although the court did not
explicitly adopt the capability rule in this case, its explanation implies that
merely operating diligently to produce and market may be enough to extend
a lease.
3.

Nevada

Nevada has no case law concerning “paying quantities” language in
reference to oil and gas leases, but it clearly recognizes the concept.
Nevada Statutory law provides that “[a] lease may be for a fixed period, and
so long thereafter as minerals, oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances or
geothermal resources are produced in paying quantities from the property
leased . . . .”318
4.

New Mexico

In Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Gilbreath, the New Mexico Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether a four-month gap in production
terminated a lease that had extended well into its secondary term.319 The
lessors leased their property in 1959 for five years and “as long thereafter as
oil, gas, casinghead gas, or other mineral or any of them is or can be
produced.”320 The lessee drilled only one well on the property, which
produced gas continually until December 1990, when the pressure in the
well suddenly dropped and failed to force the gas into the pipeline.321 In
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id. at 1374.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361.608 (West 2011).
76 P.3d 626, 628 (N.M. 2003).
Id.
Id
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January 1991, the lessees took steps to increase the pressure in the well, and
production resumed in March 1991.322
Meanwhile, the lessee began negotiating a farm-out agreement with
plaintiff Maralex Resources, who ordered a title opinion on the Gilbreath’s
mineral interest.323 The title opinion stated that the lease terminated on its
terms due to lack of production from December 1990 until March 1991
because the lessees failed to pay shut-in royalty payments.324 The lessee
then tendered a royalty payment to the lessors for the period of October
1989 to December 1990, but the lessors refused it and executed new leases
to Maralex. 325 The new lessee filed suit, claiming that the lease ended
when production ceased.326
Citing Clifton v. Koontz, the court stated generally that to hold a lease
in its secondary term, production must be in “‘paying quantities,’ such that
the income generated from oil and gas production exceeds operating costs,”
and the court proceeded to examine whether the lessee maintained the lease
via one of the savings clauses.327 The defendant argued that even if the
lessee had paid shut-in royalties once production stopped, the lease would
still have died because the well was not “capable” of production in paying
quantities.328 The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed, stating that the shutin clause in the lease at issue only allowed those payments to save the lease
when the well remained capable of producing gas.329 Finding no evidence
that the well could have produced gas, and that the lessees could not rely on
any other savings clauses in the lease, the court held that the lease ended
when production ceased.330
5.

Oregon

The Supreme Court of Oregon acknowledged the lack of case law on
oil and gas leases in the state when it addressed the question of whether a
lessee could hold a lease in its secondary term by merely prospecting for
minerals in Freemont Lumber Co. v. Starrel Petoleum.331 That case also
did not involve an oil and gas lease, but the court looked to oil and gas law
to help inform its decision, noting “the act required of the lessee for the
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 630 (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959)).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 635-37.
364 P.2d 773, 774 (Or. 1961).
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extension of the lease beyond the definite term is that he be engaged in
production of oil or gas from the land, in some quantity, before and at the
end of the definite term.”332 The court’s discussion in this case leaves open
the question of just how much production is required to take the lease into
its second term.
6.

Wyoming

Wyoming courts have defined a well as a “commercial producer” when
it pays “a profit to the lessee, over operating expenses for its operation . . .
even if the profit is small and the costs of development may never be
recovered.”333
III. CONCLUSION
Throughout the body of case law on habendum clauses in this country
runs a common theme: courts must carefully balance lessors’ desire to
benefit financially from the development of their property with oil and gas
operators’ interest in protecting their investment. The difference lies in
what tips the scale to one side or the other. The law in most states in the
East—at least on paper—appears to favor operators with its continued
reliance on the subjective, good-faith operator standard. Without evidence
of some ill intent, courts in the East tend to defer to the operator’s best
judgment in deciding whether to continue operating a lease. By contrast,
courts in the Midcontinent delve deeply into the particular actions of the
lessee, seemingly holding operators to a more stringent standard. Yet, those
courts also rely on operators’ judgment embodied in the “prudent operator”
test, thus begging the question of whether the tests these courts have taken
such care to distinguish actually bring about different results. From the
perspective of an operator looking to ensure that a lease remains valid, the
focus must be on recognizing this slight distinction and ensuring that one’s
leasehold activity and production meets the individual state’s threshold for
leases considered to be held by production.

332. Id. at 779.
333. Champion Ventures, Inc. v. Dunn, 567 P.2d 724, 728 (Wyo. 1977) (citing Sunburst Oil
& Refining Co. v. Callendar, 274 P. 834 (Mont. 1929)).

